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I. Introduction
Many forensic economists assert that a "risk-free" discount rate should be
used to discount future lost earnings to present value in personal injury cases.
By this they usually mean that the discount rate should be based on the yields
that are available on securities with no risk of default. Sometimes they also
mean that the securities should be as free as possible of inflation risk, the risk
that unanticipated inflation will diminish the purchasing power of the lump
sum award. The case for using a risk-free discount rate appears to rest primarily on the case law rather than on any underlying economic or financial
theory. And there has been a flow of recent articles arguing on economic
grounds that a "risk-adjusted" discount rate should be used instead.
The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, the paper surveys the legal
and economic issues relating to the consideration of risk in discounting future
lost earnings to present value. Second, it develops and presents empirical evidence on the effect on present values of incorporating several alternative levels
of risk into the discount rate. Data on investment returns on securities of
varying degrees of risk are combined with data on the growth of labor compensation to calculate a number of alternative net discount rates for historical periods of various lengths, and these net discount rates are used to compute present values for future periods of various lengths. This makes it possible to examine the impact of potential risk adjustments on present value under varying
circumstances.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Sections II and III briefly review the legal and economic arguments, respectively, surrounding use· of a
risk-free discount rate. Section N discusses the methods and data used to generate the empirical results, which are then briefly described in Sections V and
VI. Finally, Section VII offers some concluding comments.

II. Legal Background

•

A number of court decisions can be cited in support of the use of a risk-free
discount rate. Gilbert has argued forcefully for what he calls the "risk free criterion," quoting the U.S. Court of Appeals in Brown & Root, Inc. u. Desautel
(1977): "... the discount rate should be based on the yield paid by investments
in the safest securities, without expecting the beneficiary to exercise financial
expertise or skill." (Gilbert, 1991, p. 42) Gilbert stated that this requires a dis'Professor of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI.

263

264

JOURNAL OF FORENSIC ECONOMICS

count rate free of default risk, but he went on to say: "Ceteris paribus, the risk
free criterion also appears to require that the risk due to unanticipated inflation be minimized ...." (Gilbert, 1991, p. 42) It is generally the case that all U.S.
Treasury securities are considered to be free of default risk, but until recently,
only very short-term Treasury securities (Treasury bills) were also considered
to minimize inflation risk. Since 1997, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
(TIPS) have provided an alternative to Treasury bills as a means of minimizing
inflation risk.
Probably the most frequently cited opinion relating to use of the risk-free
discount rate comes from the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Pfeifer (1983), which in turn drew liberally upon its earlier decision in
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly (1916). According to the Pfeifer court:
The discount rate should be based on the rate of interest that
would be earned on 'the best and safest investments.' Once it is assumed that the injured worker would definitely have worked for a
specific term of years, he is entitled to a risk-free stream of future .
income to replace his lost wages; therefore, the discount rate should
not reflect the market's premium for investors who are willing to accept some risk of default. (Jones and Laughlin, 1983, p. 537)
Yandell (1991) has interpreted Pfeifer to mean that the discount rate
should be both default risk free and inflation risk free. Others have apparently
come to the same conclusion (see Romans and Floss, 1992; Albrecht and Wood,
1997). Ireland also has cited Pfeifer as the primary support for his view that
the discount rate should not carry a premium for default risk (Ireland, 1999, p.
157). He has noted elsewhere, however, that while Pfeifer mandates a U~~""V'LU"~':.
rate free of default risk, it does not mandate a discount rate free of what
calls "inflation uncertainty."l (Ireland, 1997, p. 28) Thus, all intermediate Ol'
long term Treasury securities, not just short-term Treasuries or TIPS,
presumably satisfy the legal mandate of Pfeifer.
The Pfeifer opinion arose out of a federal court proceeding dealing with fed-·:
eral statutory law (the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation,
Act), and it "sets a standard that is applied in many legal venues, both state
and federaf' (Ireland, 1999, p. 157). This probably explains why, according to a
recent survey, only U.S. government securities were used for discounting by··
82% of the members of the National Association of Forensic Economics (Brookshire and Slesnick, 1993, pp. 36-37). Still, this standard is certainly not universally applied. Forensic economists can and do testify in personal injury cases in
many legal venues using discount rates based on the investment returns available on securities that carry 3efault risk, including municipal bonds, corporate
bonds, annuities and corporate stocks. 2

lIreland distinguishes between inflation "risk," which relates to the expected rate of inflation that
is already embodied in the nominal interest rate, and inflation "uncertainty," which relates to the:.
unexpected variance in the expected rate of inflation. (Ireland, 1997, pp. 24-25) Others have used'
the term "inflation risk" to mean the same thing as Ireland's "inflation uncertainty."
2A colleague of the author has testified on corporate stock returns in at least 10 different states.
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It should also be noted that the Pfeifer opinion contains enough confusion
that it seems unlikely to be the final word (see Breeden, 2002, p. 24). Judicial
opinions can change in the face of persuasive economic arguments as well as
changing economic circumstances, such as the increasing financial sophistication of the general public. For example, approximately half of all U.S. households now own mutual funds (Investment Company Institute, 2003, p. 41), and
90% of these households hold equity funds that represent 65% of their mutual
fund portfolios (Investment Company Institute, 2003, p. 44). With so much financial information and advice now freely available in the mainstream news
media and over the Internet, it might someday be concluded that investment in
mutual funds does not necessarily require a high degree of "financial expertise
or skill."
It is often argued that there should be no connection between the determination of an appropriate discount rate and an appropriate investment allocation of a damage award. (See, for example, Romans and Floss, 1992; Ireland,
1998) As Ireland has put it:
No investment advisor would advise an award recipient to place
a lump sum in a riskless investment of any sort .. .. A reasonable investment allocation for most workers would include a significant
fraction of common stocks. The fact that the discount rate ... should
be riskless does not imply that the award should be invested in a
riskless fashion. (Ireland, 1998, p. 269)

Clearly, one possible basis for this view would be the case law from Pfeifer
and similar rulings. However, the economic basis for this view is that the appropriate discount rate, rather than reflecting the prospective investment
allocation of the award, should instead reflect the degree of risk associated
with the future earnings stream that is to be discounted. This is discussed in
detail in the following section.

III. Economic Arguments
Setting legal considerations aside, there has been an ongoing economic debate about the use of a risk-free discount rate. Jennings and Phillips (1989)
have discussed the risk associated with deviations of actual future labor income from expected future labor income. To the extent that such deviations
may occur, this would "call for the stream of expected labor earnings to be discounted by a higher, risk-adjusted rate." (Jennings and Phillips 1989, p. 123)
Their survey of the literature indicates that labor is not a risk-free asset, and
that investment in human capftal is, in fact, subject to considerable risk. They
quote other scholars to the effect that human capital is "probably more risky
than physical capital."( Levhari and Weiss, 1974, p. 950)
Phillips (1989) has categorized the risks associated with labor income into
non-systematic and systematic risks. Non-systematic risks are inherent in the
individual employee and individual employer, while systematic risks are inherent in the overall economy. Examples of non-systematic risk offered by
Phillips include skill obsolescence in the face of advancing technology or for-
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eign competition, family emergencies, and even a possibility that a particular
industry might exit from a region entirely. A further elaboration of non-systematic risk might include unanticipated health problems, changes in family
structure due to childbirth, divorce, or the death of a spouse, and the relocation
of offices, plants or production lines, all of which could adversely affect an individual's earnings. The one example of systematic risk offered by Phillips is the
possibility of cyclical unemployment, but to this could be added variations over
time in economy-wide productivity growth. Phillips has argued that the risks of
labor income call for a discount rate somewhere in-between a risk-free rate
(short-term Treasuries) and the total return on a diversified stock portfolio
(e.g., the S & P 500), and he suggests as a first approximation the use of the
AAA corporate bond rate. (phillips, 1989, pp. 93-94)
Of course, some of the risks of labor income often are accounted for by adjusting the future earnings stream itself, and when this is done it would be
"double-counting" to also adjust the discount rate for these same risks. Thus,
the "LPE" method adjusts the earnings stream downward for the probabilities
of death, non-participation in the labor force, and unemployment to obtain the
expected earnings stream. But even so, Margulis (1992) has applied generally
accepted principles of finance to reach the s~me general conclusion as Jennings
and Philltps. Margulis emphasizes that "parity in risk" should be maintained
between projected earnings and the discount rate. Only actual future earnings
are risk-free, and they are not knowable. Expected future earnings are not riskfree. According to Margulis:
To compute a lump-sum award for damages by discounting uncertain, albeit expected, future losses to present value by a risk-free
interest rate may yield an award which is excessive and which unjustly enriches the plaintiff. The correct discount rate to apply is one
which is risk-adjusted to counterbalance the forecast uncertainties
associated with estimating future losses. (Margulis, 1992, p. 41)

This position has been challenged by Albrecht (1993, 1997), who has attempted to show, using simple algebra, that a risk-free rate should be used to
discount expected earnings. Albrecht first assumes that the expected future
loss has been calculated and is known. He then defmes the· problem as one of
calculating a present amount such that the expected future value of this present amount equals the expected future loss. He then proceeds to demonstrate
that this result can be obtained only through use of a risk-free rate.
Albrecht has been challenged, and Margulis supported, by Biederman and
Baesemann (1996), who have argued that a risk-free discount rate should be.
used only in two very specia1 cases: (1) when discounting certainty equivalents,
or (2) when the decision-maker is indifferent to risk. A certainty equivalent
could, in principle, be calculated as the expected future loss less an adjustment
factor, ~ith the latter set at the level such that the certainty equivalent would
yield the same level of utility as would be obtained from the uncertain but ex- ..
pected income. If the future earnings stream being discounted does not consist
of certainty equivalents, then the use of a risk-free discount rate would be jus-
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tified only if the decision maker is indifferent to risk, i.e., risk-neutral. (Biederman and Baesemann, 1996, p. 46-47)
Henderson and Seward (1998) have also entered the fray on the side of
Margulis. Albrecht explicitly assumed risk-neutrality, and Henderson and
Seward demonstrate quite clearly that Albrecht's results do not hold if individuals are risk-averse. Since risk-aversion is the normal state of affairs, use of
a risk-free discount rate will typically result in overcompensation of the plaintiff.
A similar, more recent discussion has occurred among Bell and Taub
(1999), Ireland (1999) and Breeden (2002). Bell and Taub have taken Ireland to
task for stating that, once the earnings stream has been adjusted for non-survival, non-participation in the labor force and unemployment, the use of a discount rate that includes a premium for default risk is incorrect in that it involves double counting of the risk that the worker would not earn the projected
income. Bell and Taub have asserted that (1) there is no necessary equivalence
between the risk of not earning the projected income and the risk of default on
bonds, so reducing the projected earnings using the LPE method is not
equivalent to raising the discount rate to incorporate the probability of default,
(2) even if there were such equivalence, the LPE method does not cover all of
the risks of the future earnings, e.g., variance in productivity growth, and (3)
even if the LPE method did cover all of the risks of the future earnings, a riskfree rate should be used only for certainty equivalents.
In his response, Ireland has stated that his insistence on the use of a riskfree discount rate was primarily based on legal rather than economic grounds.
Any adjustments to be made for the risk of labor income should be made to the
earnings stream, not the discount rate, in order to comply with the law. (Ireland, 1999) In any case, it does seem clear that the LPE method does not adjust for all of the risks of future earnings:-In addition to the uncertainty of future productivity growth that has been highlighted by Bell and Taub, there are
a number of non-systematic risks that are not accounted for with this method.
Even if an individual does not die, drop out of the labor force or become unemployed, he/she may experience an unanticipated reduction in earnings in the
future for a variety of possible reasons. These might include developing health
problems of the individual or family members, a change in family responsibilities due to a change in the family structure, skill obsolescence due to advancing technology or foreign competition, and relocation decisions of the employer.
While commenting on the dispute between Bell and Taub and Ireland,
Breeden (2002) carries the discussion one step further by focusing on what he
calls the "income-variance" risk factor. Two individuals might have identical
expected future earnings streams, but the expected variance of the two earnings streams could be quite different. He offers the example of two brothers,
one a free-lance financial advisor with a widely-fluctuating income and· the
other a university administrator with a much more stable income. He suggests
that the two cases should not be treated the same, and that use of a risk-adjusted discount rate may be appropriate where the expected variance is high.
While clearly there are differences of opinion, the literature just surveyed
does convey considerable support, on economic grounds, for incorporating risk
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into the discount rate due to the inherent riskiness of labor income. To date
there has been little consideration of how risk might be incorporated into the
discount rate or of what effect this might have in practice. The remainder of
this paper seeks to fill this empirical void by showing the effect of basing the
discount rate, in whole or in part, on returns available on "risky" investments
of varying degrees of risk.

IV. Method and Data
Published surveys of forensic economics practice as well as an examination
of the forensic economics literature indicate that the most common method
used by forensic economists to estimate the present value of a future earnings
loss involves the use of long-term historical averages of discount rates and
earnings growth rates (see Brookshire and Slesnick, 1993, 1999). These average discount rates and earnings growth rates are used, either separately or
after first being combined into a net discount rate, to calculate the present
value of the future losses.
'
In this paper, this historical averages method is employed to generate net
discount rates based on historical periods of various lengths (30, 20, 10 years)
and based on the investment returns on securities of various degrees of risk
(Treasury bills, intermediate-term government securities, long-term corporate
bonds, large company stocks, a mixed portfolio). These net discount rates are
then used to estimate the present value of a future earnings loss for future periods of 30, 20 and 10 years, respectively. The net discount rate is defined as

"

[(1 + R)/(1 + G)] - 1
where R is the average compound annual rate of return on investments over
the historical period and G is the average compound annual compensation
growth rate over the· same historical period. In calculating the present value
awards, it is assumed that investment returns are received and wages paid out
at the end of each year and that the initial annual loss is $1,000, as measured
in the year just prior to the first year of the future loss period.
The investment return data used in this study are the annual returns on
Treasury bills, intermediate-term government bonds (constant five-year maturity), long-term (high-grade) corporate bonds and large company stocks cov- \
ering the period 1972-2001 from Ibbotson's. (Ibbotson Associates, 2002) These.
returns are the total returns, including capital gains and losses as well as interest and dividends. Each of these four investment vehicles is considered
separately and, in addition, a mixed portfolio is utilized consisting of 50% large
company stocks, 30% intermediate-term government bonds, and 20% Treasury
bills. This portfolio obviously represents just one of an infinite number of at.·.
ternative asset allocations that might be considered. However, it was chosen to
incorporate a significant component of "risky" securities while still represent·
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ing a relatively conservative portfolio for a long-term investor with a moderate
tolerance for risk. 3
The labor earnings series used in this study to calculate earnings growth
rates is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics index of compensation per hour in
the U.S. non-farm business sector. (See Jacobs, 2001 and Economic Report of
the President, 2003.) Given the increasing importance of fringe benefits in the
post-World War II period, a labor earnings series that includes fringe benefits
seems clearly preferable to a wage-only series for calculating net discount
rates. 4

V. Risk, Net Discount Rates and Present Values
. The main results of this study are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, each of
which is comprised of three parts. Table I-a shows, for the 30-year historical
period, 1972-2001, the average compound annual rates of return on the various
investments, 5 the average compound annual rate of growth in employee
compensation,6 and the corresponding net discount rates. These net discount
rates are used to compute the present values shown for 30-year, 20-year and
10-year future loss periods. The net discount rates range from 0.73% when the
"risk-free" Treasury bills are used to 6.01% when the riskiest alternative, large
company stocks, are used. Of course, such a wide range of net discount rates
produces a wide range of present values. In the case of the 30-year future loss,
for example, the present value ranges from $26,855 with Treasury bills to just
$13,750 with large company stocks.
Table 1-b shows the net discount rates and present values when the 20year historical period, 1982-2001, is used to derive the net discount rates. Over
this period. the average return on Treasury bills was actually lower than for
the 30-year historical period, although the average returns on government
bonds, corporate bonds. and stocks were significantly higher. When these various returns are coupled with the lower average compensation growth rate
(4.35% vs. 5.88% ), we find the net discount rates were markedly higher across
the board, but much less so for Treasury bills compared to the other investments. As a result, in comparison to the case with the 30-year historical period,
the present values derived from use of the various alternative investments are
all much lower relative to the Treasury bill present values.
Table 1-c displays the outcomes when the 10-year historical period, 19922001, is used for the historical averages underlying the net discount rates.
BLinke (1997, p. 248) recently reported data showing that corporate defined benefit pension plans
held 56% of their assets in equities. A similar allocation is often recommended to individuals of
moderate risk tolerance who are approaching retirement.
4Fringe benefits were minimal prior to World War II, but began to grow rapidly during the war and
thereafter, so they now constitute a significant fraction of total employee compensation. See Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2003, pp. 408-409.
5The compound average annual returns for the 30-yearhistorical period reported in Table 1 were
calculated from the annual return data in Ibbotson Associates, 2002, Table 2-5. The returns for the
10-year and 20-year historical periods are from Tables 2-9 and 2-11, respectively.
&The compound average annual growth rates in compensation for the various historical periods
reported in Table 1 were calculated from the data in Jacobs, 2001 and Economic Report of the
President, 2003.
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During this period, the average compensation growth rate was lower than for
the 20-year historical period (3.98% compared to 4.35%), but average returns
were also lower on all investments, and net discount rates were lower across
the board.

Table 1
Historical Net Discount Rates and Present Values
(Base Loss:::: $1,000)

Investment
Type
T-Bills
Intermed. Gov't
Corp. Bonds
Large Stocks
Portfolio

Investment
Type
T-Bills
Intermed. Gov't
Corp. Bonds
Large Stocks
Portfolio

Investment
Type
T-Bills
Intermed. Gov't
Corp. Bonds
Large Stocks
Portfolio

Ave.
Return*
6.65
8.50
8.99
12.24
10.00

I-a. Historical Period: 1972·2001
Length of Future Loss Period
1972-2001
30 Years
20 Years
10 Years
Present
Present
Present
Compo
Net
Growth**
Discount
Value
Value
Value
0.73
$26,855
$18,546
$9,610
5.88
$21,014
$15,633
$8,766
2.47
5.88
2.94
$19,753
$14,960
$8,556
5.88
6.01
$13,750
$11,461
$7,357
5.88
3.89
$17,525
$13,724
$8,155
5.88

Ave.
Return*
6.09
9.88
12.12
15.24
11.80

I-b. Historical Period: 1982-2001
Length of Future Loss Period
1982-2001
30 Years
20 Years
10 Years
Compo
Net
Present
Present
Present
Growth**
Discount
Value
Value
Value
4.35
1.67
$23,447
$16,884
$9,140
5.30
$14,860
$12,151
$7,610
4.35
$10,233
$6,880
4.35
7.45
$11,868
4.35
10.44
$9,092
$8,264
$6,030
4.35
7.14
$12,237
$10,480
$6,978

Ave.
Return*
4.56
6.73
8.09
12.93
9.40

I-c. Historical Period: 1992-2001
Length of Future Loss Period
20 Years
1992-2001
30 Years
10 Years
Compo
Net
Present
Present
Present
Growth**
Discount
Value
Value
Value
3.98
0.56
$27,545
$18,871
$9,699
3.98
2.64
$20,545
$15,385
$8,689
3.98
3.95
$17,397
$13,651
$8,131
3.98
8.61
$10,640
$9,388
$6,529
3.98
5.21
$15,011
$12,243
$7,644

*Based on data from Ibbotson Associates (2002).
**Based on data from Economic Report of the President (2003) and Jacobs (2001).
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Table 2
Potential Overcompensation from Using Risk-Free Discount Rate
2-a. Basis for Discounting: Government Bonds
Lenl! h of Future Loss Period
Historical Period
Used For Discountinl!
30 Years
20 Years
10 Years
1972-2001
28%
19%
10%
58%
39%
1982-2001
20%
1992-2001
34%
23%
12%
2-b. Basis for Discountinl!: Coroorate Borids
Historical Period
Lenl! h of Future Loss Period
Used For Discounting
30 Years
20 Years
10 Years
1972-2001
36%
24%
12%
1982-2001
97%
65%
33%
1992-2001
58%
38%
19%
2-c. Basis for Discountinl!: Portfolio
Leng h of Future Loss Period
Historical Period
Used For Discountinl!
30 Years
20 Years
10 Years
53%
35%
18%
1972-2001
1982-2001
92%
61%
31%
1992-2001
83%
54%
27%

Before proceeding, another aspect of the data shown in Table 1 should be
noted. Given the length of the future loss period, and given the investment vehicle, the estimated present value of the future loss varies considerably depending on the length of the historical period used as the basis for discounting.
This suggests that any forensic economist who uses the historical averages
method should select the historical period very carefully. 7

VI. Potential Overcompensation
The data in Table 1 illustrate just how much difference it makes when a
net discount rate based on a risk-free security (Treasury bills) is used instead
of one of the risky alternatives. If use of a risk-adjusted discount rate is considered appropriate, then discounting with Treasury bills will result in overcompensation of the plaintiff. The present value figures in Table 1 have been used
to derive the figures relating to potential overcompensation that appear in Table 2.
Suppose first that, based on legal considerations, it is considered inappropriate to expose the lump sum recipient to default risk but appropriate to expose him to moderate inflation risk. It might then be reasonable to base the
discount rate on the returns on intermediate-term government bonds. Table 2a illustrates the potential overcompensation from basing the discount rate on
Treasury bills instead. For a 30-year future loss, we would over-compensate
70thers have found problems with the accuracy of the historical averages method. For two of the
best studies, see Schilling (1985) and Haydon and Webb (1992).
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the plaintiff by 28% if we use the 30-year historical averages to derive the net
discount rate. The extent of overcompensation would be 58% if we use the 20year historical averages, and 34% if we use the lO-year historical averages. For
a 20-year future loss, the use of Treasury bills instead of intermediate-term
government bonds would result in overcompensation ranging from 19% using
the 30-year historical period to 39% using the 20-year historical period. For a
lO-year future loss, the overcompensation would range from 10% to 20%.
Suppose next that it is considered appropriate, based on economic grounds,
for the lump sum recipient to be exposed to a relatively low level of default risk
as well as some inflation risk. The returns on high-grade corporate bonds
might then be a reasonable basis for the net discount rate. (The default risk
could be minimized through investment in an appropriate mutual fund.) Under
these circumstances, if Treasury bills are used instead of corporate bonds as
the basis for discounting, the extent of overcompensation will generally be even
greater than in the previous case, as illustrated in Table 2-b. For a 30-year future loss it would range from 36% to as high as 97% , depending on the historical period used to derive the net discount rate. For a 20-year future loss, the
overcompensation would range from 24% to 65%, and for a 10-year future loss,
the overcompensation would range from 12% to 33% .
Finally, suppose that the appropriate level of risk for discounting purposes
can be represented by the portfolio described earlier, consisting of 50% large
company stocks, 30% intermediate government bonds and 20% Treasury bills,
Table 2-c shows the potential overcompensation if Treasury bills are used instead of the portfolio as the basis for discounting. For a 30-year future loss the
overcompensation would range from 53% to 92% depending on the historical .
period used to derive the net discount rate; for a 20-year future loss the over-.
compensation would range from 35% to 61%; for a 10-year future loss the overcompensation would range from 18% to 31%.
.
Other things being equal, the use of a risk-free discount rate· maximizes
the present value. If the use of a risk-free discount rate is inappropriate, then
its use would result in overcompensation for the plaintiff. As these results
show, the potential overcompensation in many cases could be very substantial.
I

VII. Concluding Comments
Where the use of a risk-free discount rate is clearly mandated by law, forensic economists must use a risk-free discount rate. This makes the determi-., •
nation of the appropriate discount rate a somewhat easier task. But forensiQ.
economists are retained as economic, not legal, experts, and should not pre;"
sume anything about the law. And where the use of a risk-free discount rate is
not clearly mandated by law, it is the responsibility of the economic expert to
apply hislher expertise to a more thorough analysis of the appropriate discount.
rate. This would include consideration of the economic arguments for incorpo":
rating risk. By considering how returns on alternative investments of varying
degrees of risk differ from the returns on Treasury bills, this paper has demonstrated that incorporating risk in a reasonable way into the discount rate can
make a significant difference in the estimate of the present value of a lost fu~
I'
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ture earnings stream. The results indicate that, under many circumstances,
the failure to incorporate risk will result in substantial overcompensation for
the plaintiff.
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